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Abstract
This study identifies the factors that create fear of impending war. War can break out regardless 
of the desires of a society. Indeed, national leaders often have no other choice but to enter a war—
aware that they may lose popularity with their constituency, but certain of the political damage 
they will accrue if they retreat from their own coercive diplomacy. However, a leader can avoid 
war if it is clear that the people are clearly against it. To resolve this issue, I elucidate the causes 
of the concept of “antiwar sentiment” in the shadow of war. This study performs experimental 
tests to identify the independent variables of antiwar sentiments, using data from two cross-
national comparative surveys: the Pacific Rim Values Survey 2004–2008 (conducted in Japan, 
the U.S., China, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Australia, and India) and the Asia Pacific Values 
Survey 2010–2014 (the same eight countries and Vietnam). In doing so, this study confirms 
which components are common to some or all nations, as well as how the components of antiwar 
sentiment vary according to the nation. Identifying the general and specific characteristics of 
antiwar sentiment in each nation contributes to preventing war in the Asia Pacific region.
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War is one of the most disastrous events for 
human beings. In the Asia Pacific region, there 
have been several international problems with 
the potential of leading to war since the Cold 
War (1945–1989)—including North Korea’s 
development of nuclear capabilities, as well 
as the ongoing Kashmir conflict initiated by 
the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. 
Numerous armed conflicts have occurred 
in the Indian region since the early 2000s, 
although they have been relatively small in 
scale and have yet to lead to formal “war” 
(defined by casualties exceeding 1,000). As 
such, frequent though they are, the military 
and nonmilitary conflicts in these regions 
have yet to result in actual war. 
That no war has broken out despite 
the high incidence of conflict in the Asia 
Pacific region indicates that states seek 
diplomatic solutions and have no desire for 
war. However, it is unclear how tenable this 
assurance of peace is for the future. Indeed, 
one theory of international politics notes that 
national leaders sometimes have no other 
choice but to engage in war to avoid suffering 
the domestic audience cost: the political 
4 The Senshu Social Well-being Review 5
damages they will sustain if they retreat from 
their own coercive diplomacy (Fearon 1994). 
In this game theory model, even the leaders of 
democratic states will opt for war more often 
than those of non-democratic states because 
their audience cost is significantly related to 
the approval rating of the government, public 
opinion, and the national election. Therefore, 
public opinion and national sentiments 
affect whether a war will break out, and it is 
possible for a war to occur during a conflict 
even if the states themselves do not desire it. 
To prevent the occurrence of an unwanted 
war, it is necessary to nullify the pressure 
of irresponsible public opinion. National 
leaders generally seek conflict resolution that 
avoids war. When the proportion of the public 
supporting the avoidance of war exceeds the 
proportion of the public against their leaders 
backing down from a war, the audience cost 
is low and the leader can avoid war more 
easily. The experiences or memories of 
war have significant impact on the national 
sensibility toward warfare (Shibai 2015). The 
desire to avoid war and solve conflict without 
bloodshed is important for the stability of 
domestic and international society. 
This study grasps the process of a 
government’s decision-making with a two-
level game model (Putnam 1988). The 
model, which formalizes the decisions of 
international politics is defined and limited 
by the processes of domestic politics. 
Political horse-trading among politicians, 
parties, and bureaucracies, and pressures 
on them from public opinion, lobbying 
groups, and economic organizations reduce 
the scope of diplomatic options available. 
For example, it is very difficult for the 
Japanese government to compromise with 
North Korea because of the great pressure 
from the Association of Families of Victims 
Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN) and 
the public opinion that supports it. If such 
actors have antiwar sentiments, it is difficult 
for their state to choose engagement in a war. 
Such effects of domestic politics are various 
and depend on the political system and social 
situation of each state. Thus, the theoretical 
framework of this analysis is the domestic-
international entanglements, especially the 
international politics that are the next turn 
to the domestic politics. This study explores 
antiwar sentiment in the shadow of coming 
war. Indeed, if the majority of nations fear 
the outbreak of war more than they resent 
their leaders retreating from the perceived 
challenge to their authority, the audience 
cost may become low enough for leaders to 
avoid war more easily. Thus, the concept of 
the antiwar sentiment profit contributes to 
the prevention of war and the stability of the 
Asia Pacific region. However, it is unclear 
what variables have effects on the antiwar 
sentiments of each nation; there may be both 
universal and specific variables that are based 
on nationalities, political systems, economic 
development, culture, and region. This study 
embodies the concept of antiwar sentiment 
profit for developing security studies in the 
Asia Pacific region. 
Given this objective, this study identifies 
the variables comprising antiwar sentiments 
by using data from two cross-national 
surveys. In doing so, the study measures 
antiwar sentiments according to an ordinal 
scale of how much people worry about war 
(“very much,” “somewhat,” “slightly,” and 
“not at all”). Of course, the degree of fear 
toward war does not completely correspond 
to antiwar sentiments (or the sense that a 
war is undesirable). Fear of war is part of the 
antiwar sentiments. The antiwar sentiment 
profit refers to the comprehensive effect of 
enabling decision makers not to select war. 
Public opinion and civil society movements 
have negative effects on a leader’s decision 
regarding war if people’s fear of war 
motivates the power of the campaigns. 
There are other variables that configure the 
antiwar sentiment profit but fear of war is the 
foundation of these. That is the reason this 
study uses the data on worrying about war 
as the important variable. The study then 
identifies the common causes of worrying 
about war in the Asia Pacific region overall, 
and the specific causes for doing so in each 
country.
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ANALYTICAL METHOD
The components of antiwar sentiments 
are unclear. Moreover, it is likely that 
the components differ from one nation to 
another because the characteristics of social 
conscience and values vary from one society 
to another. While some will be universal 
factors, other factors will be specific. This 
study seeks to identify the components 
of antiwar sentiments using experimental 
analysis.
The model employed is as follows. 
When Players 1 and 2 are in a conflict, Player 
1 is assumed to have a preference ordering: 
u1(CP: coercive diplomacy) > u1(BD: backing 
down) > u1(war). Player 1 can choose to back 
down and avoid war if they fail in coercive 
diplomacy; however, the audience cost a1(tk) 
is imposed on Player 1 when they back down, 
and Player 1 chooses war if u1(BD) – a1(tk) 
< u1(war). Moreover, the amount of the 
audience cost is directly proportional to the 
amount of past coercive diplomacy. If k is the 
frequency of past coercive diplomacy, then 
a1(tk) > a1(tk-1) is true. Therefore, the more 
Player 1 engages in coercive diplomacy, the 
more the country tends to have to engage in 
war rather than avoid it. 
There is an important point to consider 
with regard to audience cost. While audience 
cost is certainly an important concept, it 
may not confirm the effects. Using U.S. 
survey data, Tomz (2007) proves that while 
audience cost does exist, it does not increase 
consistently with the level of escalation. As 
in the case of audience cost, how the nation’s 
antiwar sentiments have an impact on the 
conflict should be analyzed. The audience 
cost will be buffered by the antiwar sentiment 
profit e. If the force of public opinion is 
consistently strong, then it is easier for the 
national leaders to back down and more 
difficult to engage in coercive diplomacy. 
Thus, both variables have an effect on 
decision-making and the preference ordering 
depends on them, as follows:
u1(CP) > u1(BP) – a1(tk) + e1(tk) > 
u1(war) if e1(tk) > a1(tk) – u1(war) – u1(BP),
u1(CP) > u1(war) > u1(BP) – a1(tk) + 
e1(tk) if e1(tk) < a1(tk) – u1(war) – u1(BP).
Moreover, the content of antiwar 
sentiments may depend on such variables 
as nationality, culture, political system, and 
so on. For example, Americans may support 
the government’s military deployment in 
the short-term, but become demotivated by 
the death of even one American soldier in a 
foreign country. The Japanese, for instance, 
are almost always negative about military 
deployment because of the nation’s past 
war experiences. Consequently, antiwar 
sentiments need to be analyzed in greater 
detail than audience cost. 
To identify and analyze the components 
of antiwar sentiments, this study uses data 
from two cross-national surveys: The Pacific 
Rim Values Survey 2004–08 (PRVS) and the 
Asia Pacific Values Survey 2010–14 (APVS) 
(Yoshino 2010; Yoshino, et al. 2015; Cross-
National Comparative Survey). The PRVS 
was conducted in Japan, the U.S., China, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia, 
and India; the APVS was conducted in the 
same countries, with the addition of Vietnam. 
As such, these surveys cover a diverse array 
of nationalities and cultures, and provide 
sufficient data for the experimental test 
conducted in this study. Random sampling 
and face-to-face interviewing methods were 
used in all surveyed areas. In addition, either 
two-stage or multi-stage random sampling 
methods were used in Japan, China, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Singapore, and 
Australia. India and Vietnam adopted their 
own sampling methods. In India, cluster 
sampling was used. In Vietnam, random 
route (also known as “soft quota” by the 
Vietnamese research company) was used (see 
the Cross-National Comparative Survey), 
shown in Table 1. 
The following questionnaire data were 
used for this analysis. The first category of 
questions collected data for control variables, 
including gender, age, income, and education. 
The second and most important questions 
consider respondents’ concerns about war: 
“To what extent do you worry, either for 
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Table 1. Survey Data: Pacific Rim Values Survey (PRVS) 2004–08 and Asia Pacific 
Values Survey (APVS) 2010–14
PRVS 2004–08 APVS 2010–14
Area Year Sample size  Area Year Sample size
Japan 2004 1,139  Japan 2010 852
The US 2006 901  The US 2010 1,002
Beijing 2005 1,053  Beijing 2011 1,000
Shanghai 2005 1,062  Shanghai 2011 1,000
Hong Kong 2006 849  Hong Kong 2011 1,000
Taiwan 2006 603  Taiwan 2011 1,000
South Korea 2006 1,030  South Korea 2012 1,000
Australia 2007 700  Australia 2012 800
Singapore 2007 1,032  Singapore 2012 1,000
India 2008 2,002  India 2013 2,000
    Vietnam 2013 1,000
yourself or for your family, about war?” This 
question was measured on a 4-point scale: 
“very much,” “somewhat,” “slightly,” and 
“not at all.” The third question is related to 
satisfaction: “All things considered, how 
satisfied are you with your family?” and 
“How satisfied are you with your life as a 
whole these days?” These two questions 
were scored according to a 5-point scale: 
dissatisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, neutral, 
somewhat satisfied, and satisfied. The final 
category considers degrees of confidence in 
national politics: “Could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in the federal 
bureaucracy (congress)?” The responses 
to this question were scored according to a 
4-point scale: “a great deal of confidence,” 
“quite a lot of confidence,” “not very much 
confidence,” and “none at all.” An explanation 
of the correlations between the fear of war 
and the other questions is provided in the 
next section. 
This study measures antiwar sentiments 
using an ordinal scale of worrying about 
war. While the degree of fear about war may 
not completely correspond to the degree of 
antiwar sentiments, they may share the same 
values to a considerable extent.
FEAR OF WAR IN THE ASIA 
PACIFIC REGION IN THE 2000S 
AND 2010S
The regions of East and South Asia have 
witnessed a high degree of conflict since the 
Cold War. Accordingly, it is expected that 
people in many Asian countries will worry 
about war owing to the shadow of war cast 
over them in their daily lives. 
The data of two cross-national 
surveys—the PRVS in the 2000s and APVS 
in the 2010s—indicate the changes in fears of 
war. As illustrated in Figure 1, the majority 
of people answered that they “worry about 
war very much” in both surveys: 37% of 
total respondents in the PRVS said they 
worry “very much,” as did 29% of APVS 
respondents. While the response rates of 
some countries are much higher in the PRVS, 
there is no significant difference between 
the results of the PRVS and APVS (which 
surveys an extra country). Nonetheless, 
despite the rate having decreased, many 
people in the Asia Pacific region continue to 
worry about war in their daily lives.
Certain geopolitical developments have 
changed the response rate of each country. 
The first change is that the responses rates of 
“very much” increased slightly in North East 
Asia and the United States: namely, Japan 
(+3.8%), the U.S. (+3.2%), Beijing (+9.2%), 
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Figure 1. Response Rates of Q.17d: “To what extent do you worry, either for yourself or 
for your family, about war”
and Taiwan (+1.2%). The second change is 
that response rates decreased significantly in 
Southwest Asia: namely, Shanghai (−3.2%), 
Hong Kong (−24.3%), Singapore (−24.7%), 
Australia (−9.1%), and India (−31.6%). The 
third change concerns South Korea (Figure 
2), where the response rates of “not at all” 
worried are much higher than in other nations 
(43.5% in the PRVS and 51.0% in the APVS). 
Figure 2 shows the changes in the 
response rates of “worrying very much” 
about war according to location. Although 
it is difficult to explain the reasons for these 
changes, certain geopolitical changes are 
likely to have affected the changed rates of 
worry about war in each area. It is likely that 
the increased worry about war between North 
East Asian countries and the U.S. result from 
North Korean nuclear development becoming 
a more serious threat between the 2000s and 
the 2010s. Japan, the United States, and 
Beijing are closely tied to the North Korean 
nuclear problem and geopolitically close to 
the Korean Peninsula (the U.S. has military 
bases in Japan and South Korea). Meanwhile, 
the decrease in worry about war in the 
countries of Southwest Asia is likely a result 
of there being no military or serious conflict 
in that region since the late 2000s and 2010s. 
It is much more difficult to estimate the 
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Figure 2. Changes of worrying about war
reason for the third change. Indeed, despite 
neighboring North Korea—with whom they 
have had a cease-fire since 1953—South 
Korea appears to reflect little worry about the 
outbreak of war.
ANALYSIS
In examining the causes of the shadow of war, 
it soon becomes clear that there are too many 
elements that have a psychological effect on 
people from one society to another. Therefore, 
this study focuses on basic variables in two 
ways. First, the basic elements that have a 
psychological effect on people regardless of 
societal or national context are examined: 
income, education, living condition, and trust 
in the state. Second, significant differences 
among the nations and original factors in 
each nation are identified and evaluated.
Gender
This study first analyzes the effect of gender 
on worry about war. Figure 3 provides the 
response rates of all males and females in 
both surveys, indicating that women fear war 
more than men. Indeed, 25.9% (APVS) and 
32.8 (PRVS) of male respondents said they 
fear war “very much,” as did 31.5% (APVS) 
and 39.9% (PRVS) of women. The same 
result is evidenced by the Cross-National 
Survey of Seven Countries (Japan, the 
U.S., and some European states) conducted 
in the 1990s (Toukeisuurikenkyuujo-
Kokuminseichousaiinkai. 1998:148–150) 
(Figure 4). When evaluating the data by 
nation, differences in the response rates of 
“very much” between male and female vary 
more in Japan, the U.S., Beijing, and Taiwan 
(the north eastern region of the map in Figure 
2) than in other nations.
In addition, the same result is found 
even though they are divided by countries 
with conscription and the others. Of male 
respondents in countries with conscription, 
21.6% (APVS: South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam) and 11.2% (PRVS: South Korea 
and Taiwan) said they fear war “very much,” 
as did 26.3% (APVS) and 16.3% (PRVS) of 
women. Even men who must go to the front 
in wartime worry about it less than women.
Shibai 9
Figure 3. Response Rates of “Worrying about War” by Gender
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Figure 4. Response Rates of “Worrying about War ‘Very much’” by Gender and Nation
Age Group
With regard to age group data, elderly 
people were shown to worry about war a 
little more than younger people, with almost 
no difference in the data of the APVS and 
PRVS (Figure 5). In terms of age groups and 
nations, however, two clear points are found: 
the younger generation does not fear war, 
and the fears of the older generation changed 
between the 2000s and 2010s. In almost all 
nations examined by the PRVS and APVS, 
the elderly generation’s ratio of “worrying 
about war very much” is the highest. In 
addition, the response rates of “very much” 
by elderly people (over the age of 50 years) 
decreased significantly in several countries: 
Hong Kong (−33.4%), Shanghai (−6.2%), 
Australia (−9.3%), Singapore (−25.9%), 
India (−31.6%), and South Korea (−4.8%). 
In contrast, worry about war appears to have 
increased slightly among elderly respondents 
in Japan (+5.1%), the U.S. (+1.2%), and 
Beijing (+13.2%). The response rates of 
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Figure 5. Response Rates of “Worrying about War” by Age Group
Polychoric Coefficient = 0.035 Polychoric Coefficient = 0.025
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“Very much” among the elderly people of 
Hong Kong, Shanghai, Australia, Singapore, 
and India are greatly decreased. On the 
other hand, the response rates of Japan, the 
U.S., and Beijing are increased. This point 
corresponds to the characteristics of the 
locations shown in Figure 2.
Income and Education 
With regard to level of income and worry 
about war, Figure 6 shows that the higher the 
level of income, the less respondents worry 
about war. This tendency is particularly 
strong in Japan, the United States, Beijing, 
Shanghai, South Korea, and Vietnam. It is 
expected that the cross tabulations of income 
are correlated to those of education because 
higher-income groups tend to have a higher 
level of education around the world.
Indeed, Figure 7 confirms a similar 
tendency between income level and the 
amount of education with regard to concern 
about war: generally, the higher the level 
of education, the less respondents worry 
about war. This is especially true in the case 
of Japan, the United States, Taiwan, and 
Australia, where the ratio of worrying about 
war “very much” to low levels of education is 
the highest in both surveys. This likely results 
from the fact that those with a high level of 
education have access to more information 
about politics and international relations, but 
also have a greater ability to critically engage 
with and analyze this information—thereby 
enabling them to judge international situations 
with greater objectivity. Media literacy is one 
of the most important forms of education in 
modern society. A high income is necessary 
to obtain much information from the media 
and a high education that includes media 
literacy is needed to understand, criticize, 
and effectively utilize the information. Graff 
indicates the relationship between education 
and fertility behavior and goals (Graff 
1995:114–45) and notes that literacy has 
been based on development of societies from 
the middle ages to the modern age (Graff 
1987). Fears tend to arise when the situation 
is ambiguous, indeterminate, and foggy: even 
a modern person feels uneasy or is sometimes 
afraid of mysterious situations where ghost-
like worries can arise out of the darkness 
and from loneliness. Education and media 
literacy levels are particularly important for 
people to be able to dispel fears.
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Figure 6. Response Rates of “Worrying about War” by Income
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Figure 7. Response Rates of “Worrying about War” by Education
Religion
In general, religion has strong effects on 
social order and is sometimes a cause of 
armed conflicts. On the other hand, secularity 
advances and people lose a religious 
orientation when the country is economically 
developed. In the Asia Pacific region, where 
there are both developed and developing 
countries, it is unclear whether religion has 
effects on worrying about war. 
Figure 8 is a cross tabulation of “having 
religious faith or not” and worrying about 
war. People who have religious faith worry 
about war more than people who do not 
have it even though there are mostly no gaps 
between them in other respects on the APVS. 
In the PRVS, the response rate of “very 
much” and “yes” is 41.1% and “very much” 
and “no” is 31.1%. In the APVS, the response 
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Figure 8. Response Rates of “Worrying about War” by Religious Faith
Polychoric Coefficient =  0.155 Polychoric Coefficient = 0.056
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rate of “very much” and “yes” is 29.2% and 
“very much” and “no” is 28.3%. 
Satisfaction with Family and Life 
It is necessary to consider the correlation 
between the fear of war and satisfaction with 
life and family. Indeed, these are important 
factors for national leaders to evaluate when 
considering war because people are more 
likely to oppose war and support them if they 
are satisfied in their daily lives and with the 
national political climate. Moreover, it is 
expected that those who are satisfied with 
their own lives and their families tend to 
worry about war much more than those who 
are not, as war disrupts daily lives and has 
a negative effect on families. As shown in 
Figure 9, the cross tabulations confirm this 
expectation: in the PRVS, the response rate 
of “very much” satisfied with life is 40.6%, 
while that of “very much” satisfied with 
family is 41.4%. These responses score the 
highest. The ratios of these responses in the 
APVS are also high: 33.4% of respondents 
said they are “very much” satisfied with life, 
while 32.9% they were “very much” satisfied 
with family. 
Contrary to expectations, however, 
Figure 9 also shows that there is a correlation 
between dissatisfaction and fear of war. In 
Japan, the United States, Taiwan, India, and 
Vietnam, many people unsatisfied with their 
family are still very much worried about war. 
The same tendency is reflected with regard 
to the responses on satisfaction with life: 
in Japan, the United Stated, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam, many of those who are dissatisfied 
with their lives worry about war. Moreover, 
APVS data indicates that many Singaporean 
and Vietnamese respondents dissatisfied with 
their lives still worry about war. 
Trust in the State
Finally, this study analyzes the correlation 
between the fear of war and trust in the state. 
If people fear war, it is expected that they do 
not trust and support their state. Figure 10 
provides the cross tabulations of responses to 
the question “How much confidence do you 
have in federal bureaucracy (congress)?” with 
worrying about war. As indicated in Figure 
10, the more people trust their state, the more 
they worry about war. This result means that 
people trust their state regardless of whether 
they fear that their state will engage in war. 
Examining this in terms of each nation, 
this tendency is particularly strong in Japan, 
the United States, Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Shibai 13
Polychoric Coefficient =  0.111 Polychoric Coefficient = 0.088
Polychoric Coefficient =  0.109 Polychoric Coefficient = 0.042
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Satisfied Somewhat
satisfied
Neutral Somewhat
dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Satisfaction with Family: PRVS
Very much Somewhat Slightly Not at all
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Satisfied Somewhat
satisfied
Neutral Somewhat
dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Satisfaction with Family: APVS
Very much Somewhat Slightly Not at all
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Satisfied Somewhat
satisfied
Neutral Somewhat
dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Satisfaction with Life: PRVS
Very much Somewhat Slightly Not at all
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Satisfied Somewhat
satisfied
Neutral Somewhat
dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Satisfaction with Life: APVS
Very much Somewhat Slightly Not at all
Figure 9. Response Rates of “Worrying about War” according to “Satisfaction with Life” 
and “Satisfaction with Family”
Singapore. The ratio of worrying about war 
“very much” and a high degree of trust in the 
federal bureaucracy or congress is the highest 
score rating for many nations. While the 
reasons for this are unclear, it is evident that 
is people who support the state tend to worry 
about war more than others. This indicates 
that the audience cost related to war is low 
when the approval rate is high, and that it is 
expensive when the approval rate is low. 
DISCUSSION
In short, the cross tabulations indicate the 
following. People in the North East area of 
the Asia Pacific region continue to worry 
about war while the fears of the nations 
in the Southwest area have decreased 
drastically. Women generally worry about 
war more than men. The elderly generations 
of some nations—predominantly in the 
North East—worry about war more than 
the younger generations. The ratio of the 
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elderly generation’s fear of war is reduced in 
Southwest Asia. People with high incomes 
and high education do not worry about war. 
Both those satisfied with their lives and 
families, and those who are dissatisfied worry 
about war more than those with intermediate 
levels of satisfaction. People who trust the 
administrative organizations have a stronger 
fear of war than those who do not trust their 
state. Finally, only South Korean people 
show a consistent lack of concern regarding 
the outbreak of war. 
As such, South Korea reflects unique 
characteristics regarding fear. In addition 
Figure 10. Response Rates of “Worrying about War” according to “Confidence in the 
Federal Bureaucracy” and “Congress”
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to not worrying about war, South Koreans 
do not appear to have significant concerns 
regarding other social problems—including 
serious illness, car accidents, unemployment, 
or nuclear power accidents. For other nations, 
more than 20% of respondents claimed they 
were “very much” worried by such issues, 
including war. In South Korea, the response 
rates of “very much” are less than 10%. This 
indicates that South Koreans are much more 
optimistic than other nations (Yoshino and 
Matsumoto 2006:41–6; Yoshino and Park 
2013:49–53; Cross-National Comparative 
Survey on National Character). 
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Figure 11. Scatter Diagrams of MCA
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Table 2. Results of Regression Analysis (R ver.3.5.1 and MASS)
　
All APVS PRVS North 
East
South 
West
South 
Korea 　
GenderM0 0.018 *** 0.024 *** 0.026 *** 0.029 *** 0.024 *** 0.038  
Age3cat 0.011  0.016  0.016  0.019 *** 0.015 * 0.029  
Edu3cat 0.013 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.022 ** 0.017 *** 0.034  
Income3cat 0.014 *** 0.023 *** 0.017 *** 0.022 *** 0.018 *** 0.030  
Family 0.013 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.019 * 0.018 *** 0.027  
Life 0.011  0.016 * 0.015 *** 0.016  0.016  0.025  
Fb 0.015  0.021 ** 0.021 * 0.027 ** 0.019  0.031  
Con 0.014 *** 0.020 *** 0.019 *** 0.025  0.019 *** 0.031  
Adjusted R^2 0.047  0.053  0.045  0.044  0.011  0.008  
N 17,595  8,883  8,712  6,202  9,556  1,837  
jp04 jp10 us06 us10 bj05 bj11
GenderM0 0.067 *** 0.080  0.077 ** 0.080 ** 0.083 *** 0.086 ***
Age3cat 0.048 *** 0.058 *** 0.046 *** 0.048 * 0.054  0.056 **
Edu3cat 0.056  0.064  0.075 *** 0.068  0.058  0.058  
Income3cat 0.047  0.076 ** 0.052  0.067 * 0.062 ** 0.072  
Family 0.050  0.055  0.050 ** 0.045  0.048  0.069  
Life 0.045  0.048  0.049 * 0.044  0.035  0.049  
Fb 0.081  0.082  0.077  0.070  0.075  0.075 *
Con 0.078  0.081  0.080  0.072  0.072  0.072  
Adjusted R^2 0.059  0.036  0.062  0.025  0.056  0.053  
N 786  642  767  794  949  883  
sh05 sh11 hk05 hk11 tw06 tw11
GenderM0 0.089 * 0.087 ** 0.064 ** 0.080 * 0.107 ** 0.079 ***
Age3cat 0.063  0.058  0.046 ** 0.058  0.085 * 0.059 **
Edu3cat 0.068  0.061  0.047 * 0.058  0.086  0.070  
Income3cat 0.062 * 0.072  0.043  0.100  0.072  0.078  
Family 0.057  0.068  0.042  0.048  0.085  0.065  
Life 0.043 ** 0.049  0.032  0.044  0.074  0.054 **
Fb 0.089  0.074  0.064  0.096  0.089  0.079 *
Con 0.085  0.066  0.063  0.096  0.089  0.076 *
Adjusted R^2 0.023  0.026  0.044  0.007  0.052  0.067  
N 784  727  757  721  495  887  
sk06 sk12 au07 au12 sg07 sg12
GenderM0 0.058  0.048  0.100  0.097  0.083  0.077  
Age3cat 0.044 ** 0.037  0.061 ** 0.060 * 0.061  0.056 **
Edu3cat 0.052  0.044 ** 0.066  0.076  0.060  0.058 ***
Income3cat 0.038  0.049  0.071  0.084 ** 0.064  0.070  
Family 0.039  0.036  0.060  0.062  0.078  0.079 ***
Life 0.036  0.035 * 0.063  0.057  0.074  0.077  
Fb 0.046  0.040  0.087  0.090  0.109  0.090 ***
Con 0.049  0.040  0.088  0.086  0.109  0.090 ***
Adjusted R^2 0.011  0.019  0.035  0.024  0.003  0.092  
N 900  937  547  591  909  935  
in08 in13 vt13
GenderM0 0.055  0.076  0.062 *
Age3cat 0.035  0.050  0.043  
Edu3cat 0.041  0.056  0.049  
Income3cat 0.036 *** 0.102  0.060 **
Family 0.058  0.075  0.054 ***
Life 0.055  0.075  0.051  
Fb 0.032 *** 0.047  0.073  
Con 0.032  0.047 ** 0.077  
Adjusted R^2 0.015  0.022  0.024  
N 1,818  834  932  
Note: Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Gender M0: dummy variable with Man=0 and Woman=1. 3cat: 3 categories. Family: satisfaction with family. Life: satisfaction 
with life. Fb: trust to the Federal bureaucracy. Con: trust to the Congress. 
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When examining these factors by 
nation, it is evident that countries in North 
East Asia have a lot in common. Factors 
correlated to worrying about war “very 
much” are as follows. In Japan they include 
the elderly generation, high education and 
low education, satisfaction with family and 
life, and trust in the federal bureaucracy and 
congress; in the United States they include 
the elderly generation, high education and 
low education, satisfaction with family and 
life, and trust in the congress; in Beijing 
they include the elderly generation, high 
education and low education, satisfaction 
with family, trust in the federal bureaucracy 
and congress; and in Taiwan they include the 
elderly generation, high education and low 
education, and satisfaction with family and 
life. 
These characteristics are also shown in 
the results of the multiple correspondence 
analysis (MCA), especially in the APVS (see 
Figure 11). 
However, several unanswered questions 
remain. For example, it is unclear why the 
opinions of South Koreans regarding war 
differ from those of other Asian nations. To 
elucidate these issues, this study performed 
a multiple regression analysis for each nation 
and group to verify the effect of each variable 
on them. Fear of war was used as the dependent 
variable according to a 4-point scale while 
other variables—gender, education, income, 
religion, family, and congress—were used as 
independent variables. 
Table 2 shows the regression coefficients 
and their p-values for each sample group. 
When focusing on the data in the first row, 
analyses of the nations’ groups, gender, 
education, income, religion, family, and 
congress are all statistically significant and 
all values of the coefficient estimates are 
positive. Life is significant in the APVS 
and PRVS, but not in the north eastern and 
southwestern areas. In contrast, age was 
a significant factor in the North East and 
Southwestern areas, but not in the APVS 
and PRVS. Nonetheless, the result of South 
Korea (sk06 + sk12) are unique: there is no 
significant independent variable. 
With regard to the time series data—
the PRVS and APVS—all variables were 
significant except for age. This shows that the 
independent variables did not change from 
the 2000s to the 2010s. In the three areas, the 
results of the North East and Southwestern 
areas are significantly similar; however, the 
degree of fear of war did change significantly. 
As such, the results indicate that the causes of 
the fear of war essentially remain unchanged 
according to the time and area. These results 
may support the argument that satisfaction 
with family and life, as well as confidence in 
the state are important factors in evaluating 
and managing the fear of war. 
Finally, when evaluating the results of 
each nation, it is apparent that gender and age 
are significant factors in Japan, the United 
States, Beijing, and Taiwan (the North 
East group). Apart from these countries, 
the significant independent variables are 
diverse. Indeed, there are more than four 
significant variables in the US06, Taiwan11, 
Singapore12, and Vietnam13 surveys alone. 
Therefore, there may be specific factors 
or hardly any variable related to antiwar 
sentiments peculiar to each nation. 
CONCLUSIONS
This study has clarified some factors related 
to the fear of war and antiwar sentiment. The 
attributable items tend to have more effect 
on antiwar sentiment than social values. 
Worry or opposition to war is felt by all 
people possessing the same attributes equally 
in a situation. Moreover, as there are few 
significant variables related to satisfaction 
and trust in the state, antiwar sentiment is not 
affected by the social contexts of each nation. 
If this argument is correct, the effect of the 
characteristics established by our shared 
human nature has a much more robust impact 
on attitudes towards war. 
This study concludes that the factor that 
may have effects on domestic-international 
entanglements, the theoretical framework of 
this article, exists and its effects run counter 
to those of the domestic audience cost. 
Therefore, the study shows that it is possible 
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for anti-war sentiments to enable decision 
makers to avoid war if its value is enough. 
This study defines the concept of the 
antiwar sentiment profit and partly shows 
it exists in the actual society. There are two 
future tasks. The first is to find all component 
factors of the antiwar sentiment profit, and the 
second is to prove that the antiwar sentiment 
profit has effects on decision-making just 
as Tomz (2007) proved the effects of the 
audience cost.
It cannot be determined whether there 
is any relevant social indigenous factor in 
nations. All of the important variables in 
social science are yet to be analyzed. For 
example, the degree of development of 
democracy and human rights is one of the 
most important variables in various fields 
of the social sciences and there are multiple 
democratized and non-democratized states 
in the Asia Pacific region. Democratic Peace 
Theory shows the correlations between 
war and the development of democracy 
as both positive and negative (Chojnacki 
2006; Doyle 1986; Russett 1993). Shibai 
and Sasaki (2016) indicate that differences 
in the development of democracy make a 
differences to social consciences. According 
to Ariely et al. (2014), former West 
German citizens who have lived in a highly 
democratized state and former East German 
ones who grew up in a communist society 
have different social consciences even in the 
2010s. It is possible that the development 
of democracy and human rights affect 
antiwar sentiment. If antiwar sentiment has 
a significant positive effect on the prevention 
of war, its components should be verified in 
greater detail. 
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